Partition and Revelation by Chang, Yun-chien & Fennell, Lee Anne
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2014
Partition and Revelation
Yun-chien Chang
Lee Anne Fennell
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yun-chien Chang & Lee Anne Fennell, "Partition and Revelation" (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper
No. 681, 2014).
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426540 
 
CHICAGO 
COASE-SANDOR INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 681 
(2D SERIES) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partition and Revelation 
 
Yun-chien Chang and Lee Anne Fennell 
 
 
 
 
THE LAW SCHOOL 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
April 2014 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
The University of Chicago, Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper Series Index: 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426540 
 
 
27 
Partition and Revelation 
Yun-chien Chang† & Lee Anne Fennell†† 
INTRODUCTION 
Although property ownership is prototypically associated 
with a single owner, land is very often co-owned. When things go 
wrong among co-owners, the law has a built-in escape hatch: 
partition. Co-tenants 1  can partition the co-owned properties 
through voluntary agreement, or any co-tenant may petition a 
court for partitioning.2 All jurisdictions we know require una-
nimity for the former but design the latter petition right to be 
unilateral.3 Partition may be either in kind (the land is physical-
ly divided up), by sale, or through some combination of these 
methods.4 Regardless of the method chosen, the judicial par-
tition process operates coercively as to at least some of the 
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 1 We will use the terms “co-owners” and “co-tenants” interchangeably to refer to 
holders of concurrent freehold interests, regardless of the specific form of co-ownership 
involved. 
 2 Some jurisdictions place limits on the judicial partition right, such as a require-
ment that voluntary partition first be sought by the parties. See Yun-chien Chang and 
Lee Anne Fennell, Appendices to Partition and Revelation, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue 1, 
1–4 (2014), online at https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/chang-fennell (Appendix A). 
 3 See id. 
 4 See Jesse Dukeminier, et al, Property 345–46 (Aspen 7th ed 2010) (examining 
judicial choices among partition methods). 
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co-tenants. It thus implicates problems of value revelation akin 
to those raised by other coercive land transfers, such as eminent 
domain. Indeed, despite receiving relatively little scholarly at-
tention, revelation in the co-ownership context raises a set of 
questions that are in some ways richer and more interesting 
than those presented by government condemnation. 
Existing economic analyses of partition have primarily ex-
amined whether partition by sale or partition in kind is more ef-
ficient, with a strong emphasis on balancing economies of scale 
against subjective attachments to the land.5 In this Article, we 
focus on two aspects of the problem that have been neglected in 
earlier treatments. First, we consider the implications of differ-
ent judicial partition procedures on the bargaining dynamics 
that precede resorting to judicial partition.6 Second, we consider 
the potential impacts on efficiency of intermediate and partial 
forms of partition, which are prevalent in practice. Considered 
together, these two branches of our analysis show how more ac-
curate revelation mechanisms might play a role in advancing 
the efficiency of co-ownership. 
One interesting and counterintuitive result of our analysis 
is that the goal of incentivizing efficient pre-partition behavior 
may be in some tension with the goal of seeking efficiency in the 
partition process itself. Perfect auction mechanisms that force 
parties to reveal subjective valuations in the judicial partition 
context could alter the negotiation dynamic in ways that make 
voluntary partition less likely. As a result, better revelation 
mechanisms may not always yield better outcomes. The chal-
lenge is to design partition approaches that allow subjective val-
ues to be taken into account in deciding how to partition proper-
ty without encouraging socially wasteful struggles over surplus 
in earlier periods. A useful partition approach must also deal 
 
 5 See Part I.A. Scholars have also investigated the existence and magnitude of dis-
counts associated with different judicial sales procedures. See Chang and Fennell, 81 U 
Chi L Rev Dialogue at 4–6 (cited in note 2) (Appendix B). 
 6 Our focus on ex ante effects parallels that in Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property 
Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 Mich L Rev 601 
(2001). We are not the first to note the potential influence of judicial partition rules on 
bargaining dynamics. See, for example, Sarah E. Waldeck, Rethinking the Intersection of 
Inheritance and the Law of Tenancy in Common, 87 Notre Dame L Rev 737, 753–54 
(2011). One element that we do not examine is the role of court delays in generating bar-
gaining leverage for co-tenants independent of the substantive rule that will be (eventu-
ally) applied. See generally Manel Baucells and Steven A. Lippman, Justice Delayed Is 
Justice Denied: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis of Hold-up in Co-ownership, 22 
Cardozo L Rev 1191 (2001). 
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reasonably well with the liquidity and coordination shortfalls 
that can hamper revelation of value in the co-ownership context. 
Because partition design features that advance some effi-
ciency goals impede others, we cannot determine the best ap-
proach without additional research—both empirical studies and 
formal theoretical modeling.7 We can say with some confidence 
that no first-best partition solution is achievable under real-
world conditions. At the same time, we see significant room for 
improvement over the status quo. Our goal in this Article is to 
lay out the considerations relevant to the choice of a new parti-
tion mechanism. 
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I critically reviews 
the prior literature on the relative efficiency of partition in kind 
and partition by sale by focusing on two areas of neglect: the 
bargaining problem faced by co-tenants under the shadow of dif-
ferent judicial partition rules, and the role of intermediate parti-
tion approaches in addressing liquidity and coordination short-
falls. Part II considers possible ways to improve partition rules 
by attending to these concerns. 
Our analysis here will be limited in three respects. First, we 
will focus only on partition as it applies to possessory interests 
in real property. Second, we will largely abstract away from doc-
trinal detail to generate a stylized account of the efficiency im-
plications of different approaches.8 Third, although we will con-
sider the localized distributive effects of different partition rules 
insofar as those effects influence pre-partition bargaining and 
value revelation, our treatment will necessarily leave un-
addressed many important normative and empirical questions 
surrounding the distributive effects of partition rules.9 
I.  BEYOND A BINARY EX POST ANALYSIS 
If the co-owners who wish to end their co-ownership rela-
tionship can arrive at a voluntary partition agreement, they will 
 
 7 For a modeling approach to a similar division problem, see generally Peter 
Cramton, Robert Gibbons, and Paul Klemperer, Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently, 55 
Econometrica 615 (1987). 
 8 Our analysis is nonetheless informed by our comparative findings, which are 
compiled in Appendix A. See Chang and Fennell, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 1–4 (cited 
in note 2). We will refer at times to the practices of particular jurisdictions. 
 9 See generally, for example, Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored Looking 
Glass: A View of Judicial Partition, Family Land Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 Wash U L Q 
737 (2000); Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi, and Richard K. Green, Forced Sale 
Risk: Class, Race, and the “Double Discount,” 37 Fla St U L Rev 589 (2010). 
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not need to seek judicial partition. One of us, using data from 
Taiwan, has shown that about 92.6 percent of the time, co-
tenants who sought to dissolve co-ownership were able to reach 
an agreement to partition their co-owned interests. 10  Still, a 
nonnegligible portion of co-tenants cannot agree and have to rely 
on the court to provide a solution. Existing analyses of the judi-
cial solution have largely approached the question from an ex 
post perspective, rather than considering the effects of the parti-
tion rule on pre-partition bargaining. The choice is also typically 
analyzed as a binary one between partition in kind and partition 
by sale, even though intermediate approaches can help to ad-
dress liquidity and coordination problems that can impede effi-
cient outcomes. We will start with a brief overview of the exist-
ing literature before turning to these two shortfalls. 
A. Subjective Valuations and Economies of Scale 
Modern jurisdictions exhibit variation as to whether parti-
tion in kind or partition by sale is preferred and as to the 
strength of the presumption in favor of the preferred approach.11 
Most American jurisdictions have a common law rule that pur-
ports to favor partition in kind, but scholars suggest that courts 
usually order partition by sale.12 The fact that there are econo-
mies of scale associated with keeping the land intact is often the 
rationale for departing from the stated preference for partition 
in kind. The most commonly cited reason for sticking with the 
traditional preference for partition in kind is the subjective value 
that one or more of the co-tenants have in the land.13 Similarly, 
 
 10 See Yun-chien Chang, Tenancy in “Anticommons”? A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis of Co-ownership, 4 J Legal Analysis 515, 535 (2012). 
 11 For details, see Chang and Fennell, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 1–4 (cited in 
note 2) (Appendix A). 
 12 See, for example, Dukeminier, et al, Property at 343–44 (cited in note 4); Mitch-
ell, Malpezzi, and Green, 37 Fla St U L Rev at 610 (cited in note 9); William B. Stoebuck 
and Dale A. Whitman, The Law of Property 223 (West 3d ed 2000). 
 13 See, for example, Delfino v Vealencis, 436 A2d 27, 33 (Conn 1980): 
[O]ne of the tenants in common has been in actual and exclusive possession of 
a portion of the property for a substantial period of time; . . . has made her 
home on the property; . . . [and] derives her livelihood from the operation of a 
business on this portion of the property, as her family before her has for many 
years. 
See also Ark Land Co v Harper, 599 SE2d 754, 761 (W Va 2004) (holding that the eco-
nomic value of the property alone is not dispositive and that “[e]vidence of longstanding 
ownership, coupled with sentimental or emotional interests in the property, may also be 
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Article 258 of the Civil Code of Japan14 and Article 100 of Chi-
na’s Property Law of 200715 stipulate that partition in kind, the 
default, can be overridden if physical division is infeasible or 
significantly value reducing. These prescriptions can be con-
strued as taking into account the economy of scale. 
Subjective valuation and economies of scale also feature 
prominently in existing economic analyses of the choice between 
partition rules, including the one offered by Professors Thomas 
Miceli and C.F. Sirmans.16 In essence, their argument is as fol-
lows: If partition in kind does not decrease economy of scale, 
partition in kind is always efficient.17 If partition in kind does 
decrease economy of scale, partition in kind is sometimes effi-
cient because it preserves subjective value, whereas partition by 
sale is sometimes efficient because it prevents the fall of market 
value due to fragmentation.18 To be more exact, “when the ag-
gregate subjective value of the nonconsenting owners” is larger 
than the premium derived from economy of scale, partition in 
kind should be used.19 
Professors Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky disa-
gree with this analysis, favoring partition by sale across the 
board.20 Their argument is that as long as co-owners participate 
in the auction, co-owners with high subjective values can pre-
serve their subjective values by winning the bid.21 Participation 
of co-owners with high subjective values in the auction does not 
ensure efficient results, however, if more than one co-owner has 
subjective value in the property. The key is that subjective value 
 
considered in deciding whether the interests of the party opposing the sale will be preju-
diced by the property’s sale”). 
 14 Civil Code of Japan Art 258, as translated in Japanese Law Translation (Minis-
try of Justice Apr 1, 2009), online at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail 
/?id=2057&vm=02&re=02&new=1 (visited Mar 2, 2014). 
 15 Property Law of the People’s Republic of China Art 100, as translated in Property Law 
of the People’s Republic of China, online at http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001 
-2010/2011-02/11/content_21897791.htm (visited Mar 2, 2014). Note: The official transla-
tion of this statute uses the term “severance” in place of “partition.” 
 16 Thomas J. Miceli and C.F. Sirmans, Partition of Real Estate; or, Breaking Up Is 
(Not) Hard to Do, 29 J Legal Stud 783 (2000). 
 17 Id at 789. 
 18 See id at 791–92. 
 19 Id at 793. 
 20 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L 
Rev 531, 601 (2005). See also Candace Reid, Note, Partitions in Kind: A Preference with-
out Favor, 7 Cardozo L Rev 855, 878 (1986). For arguments for partition in kind, see Eric 
R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 Ariz L Rev 9, 36 (2011). 
 21 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 90 Cornell L Rev at 601 (cited in note 20). 
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is idiosyncratic and nontransferable. Separate co-owners may be 
unable to band together to bid their joint valuations. Perhaps 
they are too numerous or contentious to coordinate easily, or 
they hold idiosyncratic attachments to different but overlapping 
subsets of the land. 
Liquidity often presents another obstacle. In American ju-
risdictions, the winning bidder has to pay the auction price in 
cash, and many co-tenants will not be able to do it.22 This prob-
lem could be mitigated. In Taiwan, where the winning bidder 
generally has to pay the auction price within five to seven days 
after the auction, banks provide a loan within seven days in re-
sponse to this requirement.23 Because the property’s assessed 
value determines the amount that a bank would be willing to 
lend, however, speedy loans may be insufficient to enable finan-
cially constrained co-owners with idiosyncratically high subjec-
tive valuations to protect their interests in the property. 
It is also worth noting that properties are often sold at a 
price lower than fair market value (FMV).24 Such an auction dis-
count does not necessarily signal inefficiency. Most likely, the in-
itial purchaser will be a middleperson who then resells. If the 
ultimate purchaser is the high valuer, the only question is 
whether moving the property to her in two transactions rather 
than one adds net costs. For the reasons suggested above, how-
ever, high-valuing co-tenants may fail to end up with the prop-
erty. These problems of liquidity and coordination explain why 
partition in kind could sometimes be more efficient than parti-
tion by sale. But, as we will see, partial partition in kind may do 
even better.25 
 
 22 See Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks 
Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives 122 (Basic Books 2008). See also Reid, Note, 
7 Cardozo L Rev at 872 (cited in note 20) (observing that if co-owners lack the financial 
ability to bid in the auction, courts usually will not order partition by sale). 
 23 For an example of a bank that provides this loan, see http://www.ubot.com.tw 
(visited Mar 2, 2014). 
 24 For a review of the theoretical and empirical work on the sale of properties at 
auction, see Chang and Fennell, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 4–6 (cited in note 2) (Ap-
pendix B). Fair market value is “the amount that a willing buyer would pay a willing 
seller of the property, taking into account all possible uses to which the property might 
be put other than the use contemplated by the taker.” David A. Dana and Thomas W. 
Merrill, Property: Takings 169–70 (Foundation 2002). We use fair market value and 
market value as synonyms.  
 25 See Part I.C. 
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B. Partition’s Shadow 
The analysis above assumed that the efficiency of a parti-
tion rule can be evaluated based solely on the partition event it-
self.26 But partition rules carry implications for earlier decisions 
as well.27 We will focus on the ex ante impact of judicial partition 
rules on pre-partition bargaining, but it is worth noting that a 
series of earlier decisions, including the decision to become a co-
owner or to make investments in developing subjective attach-
ments to the land, may also be influenced by the judicial parti-
tion rule. 
Central to our analysis is an understanding of judicial parti-
tion as a private taking.28 One or more of the co-owners will be 
coercively dispossessed of her undivided fractional share in the 
property and given either land or money instead. Depending on 
the applicable partition rules, a co-owner might use the judicial 
process to “take” the property of her co-tenants for less than its 
value.29 Because co-owners are also potential takees, they may 
engage in costly stratagems to stave off the taking or to bring it 
on, depending on the level of expected compensation. These con-
cerns, well-recognized in the eminent domain context, are 
heightened in the partition context because the parties them-
selves have considerable control over whether the taking will oc-
cur and considerable insight into the compensation that will be 
provided in the event the taking occurs. 
We view voluntary partition agreements as more desirable 
than judicial partition, other things equal, because they save on 
court costs and make use of a consensual rather than coercive 
 
 26 Miceli and Sirmans, for example, preface their modeling of the judicial partition 
choice with the assumption that voluntary partition is unavailable due to high transac-
tion costs. Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Legal Stud at 788 (cited in note 16). 
 27 See Bebchuk, 100 Mich L Rev at 633–34 (cited in note 6) (making an analogous 
point about the choice between liability rules and property rules). 
 28 See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U Chi L Rev 517, 565–66 (2009) (discuss-
ing overly fractionated shares in land as a situation potentially ripe for the use of a pri-
vate taking); Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Legal Stud at 791 n 22 (cited in note 16). 
 29 See Bell, 76 U Chi L Rev at 566 (cited in note 28); Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Legal 
Stud at 791 & n 23 (cited in note 16). The point is stronger here than in the context of 
eminent domain. When the government is the taker, it is not entirely clear whether and 
how monetary payments influence incentives to take. See, for example, Daryl J. Levin-
son, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv L Rev 915, 916, 969 
(2005); Yun-chien Chang, Private Property and Takings Compensation: Theoretical 
Framework and Empirical Analysis 14–46, 75–89, 138–39, 158–60 (Edward Elgar 2013). 
For private parties, the relationship between monetary payoffs and incentives is far 
more direct and uncontroversial. 
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transfer process.30 Thus, we count it as a point in favor of a judi-
cial partition method if it can control pre-partition strategizing 
and encourage efficient voluntary partitions. Neither an across-
the-board rule of partition by sale nor a blanket rule of partition 
in kind can reliably achieve this result. Either rule may offer 
some co-tenants an attractive strategic opportunity to pursue 
the less socially valuable type of partition in a given case.31 
Suppose there are two types of co-tenants, some with high 
subjective values (HSV co-tenants) and some whose valuations 
merely track the fair market value of the property (FMV co-
tenants). Many co-ownership situations will involve a mix of 
these co-tenant types. Consider first a judicial rule of partition 
by sale. HSV co-tenants will be fearful of the judicial partition 
process if they lack the financial ability to be the high bidder in 
a sale. Knowing this, FMV co-tenants may attempt to extract 
side payments from the HSV co-tenants for not seeking judicial 
partition. These efforts (and the efforts of the HSV co-tenants to 
resist making such payments) will be socially costly, regardless 
of the distributive result. 
The bargaining situation is not necessarily improved if the 
HSV co-tenants are able to bid in the partition sale. FMV co-
tenants may resist an efficient voluntary agreement to partition 
the property in kind if they believe they will get a greater sur-
plus from a partition sale. This could occur if the partition sales 
procedure will induce an HSV co-tenant to bid her true valua-
tion and will require her to disgorge equal shares of that win-
ning bid to her co-tenants. 32  This procedure will effectively 
transfer some of the HSV co-tenant’s subjective surplus in the 
property to the FMV co-tenants, and it will do so at positive cost. 
Interestingly, this problem becomes more severe the better the 
 
 30 A consensual process might have autonomy-based or distributive advantages, in 
addition to any efficiency advantages it might have in harnessing information. One of us 
has argued that property rules, which rely on a consensual process, are more efficient 
than liability rules, which utilize a coercive process, because the former better harness 
private information. See Yun-chien Chang, Optional Law in Property: Theoretical Cri-
tiques *28–29 (Nov 2013), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2351651 (visited Mar 2, 
2014). The extent and indeed existence of this advantage in the co-tenancy context is 
open to debate and subject to empirical verification. 
 31 An extended example that explores these bargaining dynamics is provided in 
Appendix C. See Chang and Fennell, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 6–12 (cited in note 2) 
(Appendix C). 
 32 Whether an auction procedure would actually elicit true valuations or require 
parties to disgorge a share of their subjective value depends on the design details of the 
auction procedure. See Part II.A. 
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judicial sales procedure does at eliciting honest revelations; a 
blunter procedure would reduce the incentive of the FMV co-
tenants to strategically seek judicial partition.33 
An inverse problem exists when bargaining in the shadow of 
judicial partition in kind. Here, the HSV co-tenants could stand 
on their rights and threaten to invoke the judicial partition pro-
cedure even when partition by sale would be much more effi-
cient, as where economies of scale are great. In such a case, the 
HSV co-tenants might threaten to seek judicial partition in kind 
unless they are paid off by the FMV co-tenants. Indeed, some 
FMV co-tenants might masquerade as HSV co-tenants in an ef-
fort to glean more of the surplus that a sale of the property 
would bring. These efforts would again be socially costly, even if 
unsuccessful. Moreover, the HSV (or faux HSV) co-tenants could 
proceed to invoke judicial partition in kind in order to gain own-
ership of fragments that could enable them to operate as hold-
outs in any later-attempted reassembly of the land. 
If the parties were always certain that the efficient judicial 
partition choice would be made by a court—whether partition in 
kind or partition by sale—none of the co-tenants could threaten 
the other with an inefficient procedure merely to extract sur-
plus.34 But to make the efficient choice, the court needs to ascer-
tain whether the value derived from economy of scale is larger 
than the subjective value lost through auctioning properties off. 
While the extent of economy of scale can be assessed objectively 
by, say, hedonic regression models,35 subjective value is notori-
ously unobservable by third parties, such as courts.36 Miceli and 
 
 33 This suggests a possible silver lining to the auction discount, at least if the HSV 
co-tenants have the ability to participate in the auction. See text accompanying notes 
24–25; Chang and Fennell, 80 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 4–6 (cited in note 2) (Appendix 
B). 
 34 The statement in the text sets aside the role of time delays in independently gen-
erating bargaining leverage. See generally Baucells and Lippman, 22 Cardozo L Rev 
1191 (cited in note 6). 
 35 Hedonic regression models can be used to first estimate the market value of the 
whole plot and then used to estimate the summation of market value of each postparti-
tion parcel. The difference in the two estimates is the value of scale economy. Hedonic 
regression models have been used to estimate market value of real properties in, for ex-
ample, Yun-chien Chang, An Empirical Study of Court-Adjudicated Takings Compensa-
tion in New York City: 1990–2003, 8 J Empirical Legal Stud 384, 392–401 (2011); Yun-
chien Chang, An Empirical Study of Compensation Paid in Eminent Domain Settle-
ments: New York City, 1990–2002, 39 J Legal Stud 201, 214–21 (2010). 
 36 See Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Legal Stud at 793 (cited in note 16); Yun-chien 
Chang, Economic Value or Fair Market Value: What Form of Takings Compensation Is 
Efficient?, 20 S Ct Econ Rev 35, 64 (2012). 
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Sirmans’s analysis suggests a rough proxy: that partition in 
kind should be preferred when the land parcel is large and the 
number of co-owners is small.37 But this proxy is insufficient to 
ensure efficient results and may not successfully control strate-
gizing.38 
In fact, courts typically leave open the possibility of either 
partition procedure. On one view, this lack of clarity may im-
pede the voluntary partition bargaining process. Parties may be 
too eager to go to court, each believing he or she can convince 
the court that economies of scale outweigh subjective valuations, 
or vice versa. On the other hand, the uncertainty of the judicial 
partition outcome could reduce certain forms of strategizing and 
improve bargaining.39 Ideally, a legal rule would accommodate 
co-tenants’ efficiency-enhancing reasons for requesting or resist-
ing a particular partition method (that it will preserve or de-
stroy subjective value, or that it will realize or undermine econ-
omies of scale) without encouraging costly efforts to wrest 
surplus from other co-tenants. 
In addition to raising questions about the optimal strength 
and clarity of the default rules, this analysis raises empirical 
questions about how likely the judicial partition rule is to influ-
ence the success rates of private bargaining. 
C. Intermediate Partition Approaches 
The existing economic literature on partition has primarily 
focused on the choice between partition in kind and partition by 
sale.40 But courts need not make a binary choice between these 
partition methods. Indeed, even traditional partition in kind is 
often accompanied by compensatory payments among the 
parties, known as owelty.41 A variety of other intermediate 
 
 37 See Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Legal Stud at 793 (cited in note 16) (examining the 
effect of lot size and number of parties on the efficiency of competing partition methods). 
 38 For example, some situations involving diseconomies of scale may also argue for 
partition by sale. See Chang and Fennell, 81 U Chi L Rev Dialogue at 12–13 (cited in 
note 2) (Appendix D). 
 39 See generally Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal 
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L J 1027 (1995). 
 40 See, for example, Bell and Parchomovsky, 90 Cornell L Rev at 600 (cited in note 
20). 
 41 Owelty may be used where the property is not amenable to division into equally 
valuable segments, perhaps due to improvements. See, for example, Dukeminier, et al, 
Property at 343–44, 358 (cited in note 4); John G. Casagrande Jr, Note, Acquiring Prop-
erty through Forced Partitioning Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 BC L Rev 755, 764 
(1986). 
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approaches exist in practice. For example, the Russian system 
couples a strong presumption in favor of partition in kind with a 
put option that lets any co-tenant be bought out upon her de-
mand.42 Some US jurisdictions offer an allotment system that 
gives co-owners who desire continued possession the option to 
buy out the co-owners who have petitioned for a partition sale.43 
A variation enables some co-owners to break off a portion of the 
property for exclusive possession while the balance is divided or 
sold.44 Court-ordered partial partition is also commonly used in 
some jurisdictions: empirical studies in Taiwan, for example, 
show that the court orders partial partition about 60 percent of 
the time.45 
In this Section, we consider the intermediate solution of 
partial partition. To motivate the discussion, consider the follow-
ing example. A decedent leaves Homeacre to his two children, 
Ann and Burt, and to a longtime family friend, Casper, in equal 
undivided shares. Homeacre contains two structures: a family 
home that sits on two-thirds of the lot, and a detached garage 
apartment that sits on the remaining third, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 42 The Civil Code of the Russian Federation provides: 
If the partition of a participatory share in kind is not permitted by a law or is 
impossible without incommensurate damage to property in common ownership, 
the partitioning owner shall have the right to payment to him of the value of 
his participatory share by the other participants of participatory share owner-
ship. 
Civil Code of the Rus Federation Art 252(3), as translated in 2 Russia & the Republics 
Legal Materials Part One at 123 (Juris 2013) (William E. Butler, ed and trans).  
 43 Zachary D. Kuperman, Note, Cutting the Baby in Half: An Economic Critique of 
Indivisible Resource Partition, 77 Brooklyn L Rev 263, 290–95 (2011) (detailing this ap-
proach, which a substantial minority of US jurisdictions have adopted in some form). 
The Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act (UPHPA) drafted by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2010 also includes this approach. See 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Partition of Heirs 
Property Act § 7, online at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/partition%20of%20heirs 
%20property/uphpa_final_10.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014). See also Kuperman, Note, 77 
Brooklyn L Rev at 293 (cited in note 43). 
 44 See Casagrande, Note, 27 BC L Rev at 764 (cited in note 41). 
 45 See Chang, 4 J Legal Analysis at 535 (cited in note 10). Partition in kind and 
partition by sale are each ordered about 20 percent of the time. Id. See also Uniform Par-
tition of Heirs Property Act § 8, comment 1 (cited in note 43) (observing that “[i]n many 
[US] states, a court may order a partition in kind of part of the property and a partition 
by sale of the remainder”). 
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FIGURE 1.  HOMEACRE 
 
 
Ann and Burt grew up in the family home, and Casper, an 
impecunious musician, has been living rent-free in the garage 
apartment for the past twenty years. Ann wants to live in the 
family home, but only if she can have all of Homeacre, including 
the garage apartment and surrounding yard. Burt, who never 
liked Homeacre, just wants his share of the money from sale. 
Casper desperately wants to continue living in the garage, 
which occupies a central location in a community to which he is 
deeply attached and has many features that he has tailored to 
his highly idiosyncratic tastes. The fair market values and the 
subjective increments46 that the co-owners attach to the areas in 
Homeacre identified in Figure 1 are set out in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 We refer here to the difference between the party’s reservation price and fair 
market value. See Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, Property 249 (Oxford 2010) 
(identifying a “subjective premium”). The subjective component of an owner’s valuation 
is sometimes called the “consumer surplus.” See James E. Krier and Christopher Serkin, 
Public Ruses, 2004 Mich St L Rev 859, 866. 
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TABLE 1.  VALUATIONS OF HOMEACRE’S AREAS 
 Fair 
Market 
Value 
Subjective 
Increment 
[Held By] 
Total 
Economic 
Value 
Portion with 
Home  
(Areas 1 and 2) 
$150K $0 $150K 
Portion with 
Garage 
Apartment 
(Area 3) 
$50K $105K 
[Casper] 
$155K 
Whole Parcel 
(Kept Intact) 
(Areas 1, 2, and 3) 
$250K $50K 
[Ann] 
$300K 
 
In this case, the total economic value47 is greater when split-
ting the property into two pieces ($150K + $155K = $305K) than 
when keeping it together as a whole ($300K). But it would also 
be economically destructive to order partition in kind full stop, 
as this would require physically splitting up the family home, 
which now occupies two-thirds of the property. We can assume 
that Ann and Burt, each left with a portion of a house, would 
eventually coordinate to sell it, but there would be a significant 
hassle factor. Partition by sale would maximize value if Casper 
could be the high bidder; he could then keep the garage apart-
ment portion and sell the balance, producing the most valuable 
use of the land. But Casper is illiquid, and hence not a good can-
didate to be the high bidder. Alternatively, Ann could be the 
high bidder at $300K and then sell the two pieces separately, 
but again, Casper will be unable to bid his valuation of $155K. A 
sale will at most yield the parties a total value of $300K. 
Enter partial partition. The court could let Casper keep his 
portion of the land, and order partition by sale as to the balance. 
As Table 2 shows, this solution maximizes the property’s total 
economic value.48 
 
 47 Economic value is the total value an owner attaches to a certain thing. It com-
prises an objective part (fair market value) and an additional subjective increment. See 
Chang, Private Property and Takings Compensation at 5 (cited in note 29). 
 48 It is worth remarking on the ambiguous distributive posture of this result. From 
the perspective of fair market value, Casper appears to be getting shortchanged. He ends 
up with property that has a fair market value of $50K, while Ann and Burt get property 
with a fair market value of $150K, or $75K each. From another perspective, however, 
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TABLE 2.  PAYOFFS FOR ANN, BURT, AND CASPER UNDER 
DIFFERENT PARTITION APPROACHES 
 Ann’s payoff Burt’s 
payoff 
Casper’s 
payoff 
Total 
(1) Full partition in 
kind 
$55 
($75 less $20 
in hassle) 
$55 
($75 less 
$20 in 
hassle) 
$155 † 
(tie)  
$265  
(2) Partition by sale, 
and Ann, Burt, and 
Casper do not 
participate in the 
auction 
$83.33  $83.33  $83.33 $250 
(3) Partition by sale, 
and Ann is the 
highest bidder (at 
her reservation 
price) 
$100 
($300 less 
$200 to pay 
off others) 
 $100 † $100  $300 
(4) Partition by sale, 
and Ann is the 
highest bidder (at 
FMV) 
$133.33 
($300 less 
$166.66) †  
$83.33 $83.33 $300 
(5) Partial partition: 
Partition in kind for 
the garage portion 
(area 3); partition by 
sale for the home 
portion (areas 1 and 
2) 
$75 $75 
 
$155 † 
(tie) 
$305 †  
† marks the best partition approach for a co-tenant and in total. 
Note: Gray shading indicates the party retains physical possession of all or 
part of the property. Values are given in thousands. 
 
 
Ann and Burt are getting shortchanged. Casper gets something worth $155K to him, 
while they only get $75K each. He gets more than half of the total economic value gener-
ated by the property, whereas if the total of $305K were divided in thirds, they would 
each get $101.66K. At the same time, Casper’s insistence on partition in kind deprives 
Ann and Burt of the chance to sell the property at a price that would exploit economies of 
scale; if it were sold at fair market value of $250K, each would receive $83.33K. Ann is 
also losing the chance to be the high bidder and Burt is losing the chance to share in the 
surplus that Ann’s high bid would generate, if the procedure were one that would elicit 
Ann’s reservation price. These distributive questions will resurface in Part II’s discus-
sion insofar as they bear on the earlier decisions or bidding behavior of the parties. 
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Significantly, a partial-partition alternative will not be pur-
sued if the court follows a rule that seeks to maximize the fair 
market value of the land; fair market value is higher if the prop-
erty is kept as a unit. Moreover, if the judicial partition regime 
requires or allows courts to move directly to partition by sale if 
full partition in kind is infeasible, then the court would again 
choose an inefficient outcome, given liquidity constraints. Add-
ing the alternative of partial partition can improve the efficiency 
of judicial partition outcomes. 
As this example shows, partial partition can address liquidi-
ty problems that prevent HSV co-tenants like Casper from being 
the high bidder. Partial partition can also be valuable when 
multiple co-tenants hold high subjective values in different por-
tions of the property. Rather than requiring them all to bid 
against each other and then engage in further transactions 
amongst themselves to get each section of the property back to 
its highest valuer, a partial-partition procedure can simply allo-
cate the property to those who wish to remain in possession (so 
long as the areas in which they hold subjective value do not 
overlap) while cashing out the shares of the other co-tenants. 
Carrying out a partial-partition plan requires establishing 
rules for how payments will be collected from and disbursed to 
the co-tenants. More fundamentally, it requires some method for 
determining when partial partition is appropriate. The associat-
ed design challenges are explored in the next Part. 
II.  REFORM AND REVELATION 
As our analysis to this point has indicated, a workable set of 
partition rules must not only account for the core factors of 
economies of scale and subjective valuations, but must also con-
tend with pre-partition strategic behavior and barriers to bid-
ding such as liquidity shortfalls and coordination problems. In 
this Part, we examine partial-partition approaches that would 
make use of information about subjective valuations elicited 
from the co-tenants. Section A considers the difficulties associat-
ed with obtaining truthful information in this context. Section B 
offers a concrete proposal designed to spur further dialogue. 
A. Self-Assessment-Based Partition Rules 
As we have seen, the efficient resolution of a partition ac-
tion may depend on private valuation information that is inac-
cessible to a court. One possibility is to use the co-tenants’ own 
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self-reported valuations to inform the decision. Self-assessed 
valuation mechanisms have received primary attention in the 
eminent domain context,49 but in some ways the partition con-
text is a more promising setting in which to apply these ideas.50 
The basic idea behind self-assessment is that the owner of a 
piece of property is in the best position to know its value. The 
challenge is to devise a mechanism that will induce her to reveal 
it. Such a mechanism must be capable of checking both over-
statements and understatements, and this requires that two 
consequences tending in opposite directions attach to any state-
ment of value that an owner submits.51 
There are three types of consequences that might attach to a 
co-tenant’s statement of value. The first is simply whether the 
co-tenant gets her way with respect to the dissolution of the co-
tenancy. If she wishes to stay on the land, does she get her wish? 
Second, there is the question of what, if anything, she must pay 
out to the other co-tenants. Third, there is the question of what, 
if anything, she will receive from the other co-tenants. These 
last two consequences together determine the positive or nega-
tive price associated with the co-tenant getting or not getting 
her way in the partition proceeding. And these same conse-
quences will influence both valuation statements and the deci-
sion to seek or resist judicial partition in the first place. 
To return to the private taking analogy, a co-tenant who 
stays on the land or who is a winning bidder is in the role of a 
taker who must compensate the others, while a co-tenant who 
 
 49 See, for example, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensa-
tion Private, 59 Stan L Rev 871, 890–905 (2007); Yun-chien Chang, Self-Assessment of 
Takings Compensation: An Empirical Study, 28 J L, Econ & Org 265 (2012). See also 
Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 Va L Rev 
771, 789–90 (1982). 
 50 For a recent application of a self-assessment approach to “indivisible” property 
held in common, see Kuperman, Note, 77 Brooklyn L Rev at 295–300 (cited in note 43). 
Self-assessment has been used or proposed in a variety of other situations. See, for ex-
ample, Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier, Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial 
Resolution of Business Deadlock, 81 U Chi L Rev 203 (2014) (dissolution of business enti-
ties); Richard A. Epstein, The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems, 81 U Chi L Rev 
109, 119–21 (2014) (general average contribution); Levmore, 68 Va L Rev 771 (cited in 
note 49) (several examples, from “claiming” horse races to tort law); Lee Anne Fennell, 
Revealing Options, 118 Harv L Rev 1399, 1444–81 (2005) (land use examples). 
 51 See, for example, Chang, 20 S Ct Econ Rev at 67–73 (cited in note 36); Epstein, 
81 U Chi L Rev at 109–10 (cited in note 50). For a recent discussion of the challenges in-
volved in designing such a mechanism and the parameters that must be satisfied to in-
duce honest valuations, see Florenz Plassmann and T. Nicolaus Tideman, Marginal Cost 
Pricing and Eminent Domain, 7 Found & Trends Microecon 1, 38–98 (2011). 
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loses out is in the role of a takee who receives compensation 
from the others. A party will want to take when she will have to 
compensate less than what she will gain in kind, while a party 
will hope to have her property taken if she will be compensated 
beyond the level of her loss. Likewise, a party will not want to be 
in the role of a taker if she will have to compensate beyond her 
gain, and will not want to be a takee if she will receive less com-
pensation than she loses in kind. The valuation statement itself 
can determine whether one will be a taker or a takee and what 
price one will receive or pay in that role. 
One approach would simply be that if the valuer gets her 
preferred solution, the court will use her stated subjective value 
to ensure that all parties receive equal shares from the partition 
action.52 Consider again the example of Ann, Burt, and Casper. 
If the parties submitted the valuations implicit in Table 1 above, 
this information would reveal to the court that the optimal solu-
tion would entail breaking the property into two parts, one of 
which would go to Casper and the other of which would be sold. 
The total economic value (counting Casper’s subjective premi-
um) of $305K would then be split three ways, $101.66K each. 
Because the property that Ann and Burt will receive brings each 
of them only $75K, each would be entitled to receive a payment 
of $26.66K from Casper. This is no different from the distribu-
tive result that would have obtained had there been a partition 
auction in which Casper was induced to pay his reservation 
price for the whole property. The only difference is the revela-
tion mechanism. 
A concern is that parties like Casper will understate their 
valuations because the payments they must make are tied to 
their bids. If they have full information about the valuations of 
the other parties, they would try to state a value that is epsilon 
above the next highest bid. Of course, other co-tenants might at-
tempt to push up Casper’s valuation statement (since it deter-
mines what they will receive from Casper) by threatening to 
place overstated bids of their own. As Casper attempts to avoid 
stating his full subjective value and as his co-tenants attempt to 
force him to do so, understatements and overstatements may 
place the property in the hands of the wrong party. 
 
 52 This approach equates to a first-price auction. For a general introduction to and 
comparison of types of auctions, see Yaad Rotem and Omer Dekel, The Bankruptcy Auc-
tion as a Game—Designing an Optimal Auction in Bankruptcy, 32 Rev Litig 323, 358–73 
(2013). 
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Yet even if this alternative did a reasonably good job of 
checking overstatements and understatements, the fact that the 
amount of one party’s subjective valuation determines the pay-
outs to other co-tenants could be problematic from an ex ante 
perspective. It could lead other co-tenants to strategically seek 
judicial partition simply to receive transfers of subjective premia 
from other co-tenants. A procedure that instead ties payouts by 
a winning co-tenant to another metric, such as the amount that 
the other co-tenants lose when the court adopts her solution over 
another, could help to address this issue, although it would do so 
imperfectly. 
For example, a court might require a party like Casper who 
wins partial partition in kind as a result of his valuation to com-
pensate the other parties for any difference between the value of 
the shares of the sales proceeds they will realize from the bal-
ance of the property, and the shares they would have received 
had the entire property been sold as a consolidated unit. This, of 
course, raises the question of what auction or sales mechanism 
would have been employed to sell the unit as a whole. Depend-
ing on the procedure used, the sales price could be anywhere 
from Ann’s full reservation price to something less than fair 
market value. Regardless of the metric chosen, Casper’s pay-
ments to the others would not be benchmarked to his own valua-
tion statement, but rather to someone else’s valuation of the en-
tire parcel that is elicited through an auction or other revelation 
procedure. 
Will such an approach induce more honest valuations? Cas-
per may be wary of overstating his subjective surplus when it 
could produce a result—partition in kind plus a duty to compen-
sate—that he likes less than simply getting a share of the pro-
ceeds from selling the parcel as a whole. If he is sure he will be 
better off with partition in kind (after compensating the others), 
he might well overstate his valuation to be assured of winning 
partition in kind—and this mechanism would allow him to do so 
with impunity.53 But his overstatement would not produce ineffi-
ciency relative to partition by sale; by hypothesis, Casper is the 
 
 53 Because there is no penalty tied to the magnitude of his statement once it is over 
the threshold that wins partition in kind and triggers his compensation obligation, he 
would not be further constrained from making an overstatement. 
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highest valuer.54 While it is always possible for Casper to miscal-
culate and overbid in error, he is less likely to make this mistake 
when there are clear reasons to doubt that his preferred solution 
is the efficient approach—as where there is a large economy of 
scale associated with keeping the property whole.55 
Casper also has no obvious incentive to understate his sub-
jective surplus because the amount he has to compensate the 
others does not depend on how high or low his valuation is, but 
rather on how high or low the hypothetical sales price would be 
for the whole property. Of course, the same liquidity problem 
mentioned above might recur here, causing Casper to simply ac-
cept partition by sale rather than submit any valuation state-
ment at all. But this problem is significantly buffered in this 
context, and presumably easier to solve. Instead of having to go 
to an auction and bid the full amount of his subjective value 
(which is far above the property’s market value), he need only 
come up with a fraction of that amount to pay the others.56 
So far we have been vague about how the payouts from Cas-
per to the other parties would be calculated under this alterna-
tive. How we resolve this question will introduce new concerns, 
including the possibility of strategic bidding by Casper’s co-
tenants. Suppose Casper’s payouts were keyed to Ann’s valua-
tion of $300K. If Casper were required to bring everyone to the 
level they would have occupied had Ann bid this amount and 
distributed the proceeds equally, then he would have to pay both 
Ann and Burt $25K each. 57  Because this result compensates 
Burt beyond the baseline of FMV, it might cause Burt to seek 
judicial partition and resist a voluntary solution. 
 
 54 As our regime does not seek to use self-assessed value in the future (such as in 
levying property taxes), it does not matter that the highest valuer exaggerates his or her 
true value. 
 55 This is because he would run the greatest risk in such situations of getting his 
way and then having to (over)compensate the others. Depending on how his compensa-
tion to the others will be determined, he might also be deterred from overstating his val-
ue if he knew another co-tenant, such as Ann in our example, also held significant sub-
jective value in the property, or if he feared strategic bidding by one or more of his co-
tenants. See text accompanying notes 57–58.  
 56 If Casper cannot access equity in the property immediately, an alternative would 
be to place a lien on the property. See Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: 
Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108 Mich L Rev 189, 212 (2009) (explaining how a lien 
could address liquidity issues in an expanded restitution context). 
 57 Areas 1 and 2 are expected to sell for $150K, which will give Ann and Burt $75K 
each. An additional $25K would bring each to the $100K level that would result from an 
even split of Ann’s bid of $300K. 
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Perhaps more worrisome is the fact that it might cause Ann 
or Burt to strategically overstate their valuations to increase the 
share they will receive from Casper.58 They run a risk in increas-
ing their bids if they are uncertain about Casper’s true subjec-
tive valuation, since they might accidentally outbid him and 
then have to compensate the others. If Casper fears their over-
bids will dispossess him of the property, he might overstate his 
own bid, though again, he does so at the risk of ending up hav-
ing to compensate for a second bid that is above his own true 
reservation price. The full dynamic must be left to formal model-
ing and empirical testing, but the risk exists that the parties’ 
strategic behavior will produce inefficient results. 
Another option would merely require the winner to compen-
sate his co-tenants for their share of the whole property’s FMV. 
This approach has the advantage of controlling gaming by the 
FMV co-tenants who would otherwise try to increase their com-
pensation. The disadvantage is that there would be no check on 
overstatements by HSV co-tenants like Casper and Ann. They 
would each put in infinite bids in an effort to outbid the other, 
knowing that they would only be obligated to compensate the 
other co-tenants at FMV. 
A final set of possibilities would break the link between the 
amount that Casper must pay and the amount that his co-
tenants receive.59 For example, suppose Casper had to pay an 
 
 58 The procedure described in the text equates to a second-price or “Vickrey” auc-
tion. As Professor William Vickrey himself recognized, collusive bids by sellers designed 
to “jack the price up” can undermine the procedure’s truth-revealing properties. William 
Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J Fin 8, 22 
(1961) (noting this problem and suggesting countermeasures). Co-tenants who expect to 
lose the auction and receive the proceeds of the second bid are effectively in the position 
of a seller—yet unlike ordinary sellers, they are entitled to bid on the property. 
 59 Delinking of this sort has featured in some past auction proposals. See, for ex-
ample, Clark Wiseman, Rezoning by Auction—A New Approach to Land Use Decisions, 
35 Utah Sci 86, 87–88 (1974) (describing an auction procedure in which those who win a 
rezoning must pay their own valuations but those who lose receive only their own valua-
tions); T. Nicolaus Tideman and Gordon Tullock, A New and Superior Process for Making 
Social Choices, 84 J Polit Econ 1145, 1148 (1976) (explaining how under a Clarke-Groves 
voting mechanism “[a]ny money collected from voters . . . must be wasted or given to 
nonvoters to keep the incentives correct”). The problem remains of what shall be done 
with the excess money that Casper must pay but that his co-tenants will not receive 
back. Because the money is collected in a judicial partition procedure, it would be feasi-
ble to simply establish a fund related to the administrative costs of adjudicating co-
ownership disputes into which excess monies could be deposited. See Wiseman, 35 Utah 
Sci at 88 (cited in note 59) (suggesting that differences between auction payments in and 
out, net of administrative costs, “be treated as general tax revenue”); Tideman and 
Tullock, 84 J Polit Econ at 1154 n 2 (cited in note 59) (“One possibility for avoiding waste 
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amount that would be sufficient to give his co-tenants their 
shares of the total economic value of the property ($305K, on the 
numbers above), but that his co-tenants actually received only 
their share of the property’s FMV. This approach would limit 
overbidding while avoiding gaming by FMV co-tenants (includ-
ing in the initial decision to seek judicial partition). It would 
likely produce underbidding (like any other first-price auction), 
but at least there would not be a concern about FMV co-tenants 
attempting to force up the bid. The downside of this approach is 
that other HSV co-tenants like Ann would receive payouts that 
are significantly less than their subjective valuations. This pro-
spect could open the door to ex ante strategizing or could lead to 
overbidding behaviors to avoid bearing a loss. 
A variation on this theme, which we will use as the basis for 
our proposal below, would allow co-tenants who elect partial 
partition in kind to recover their shares of their own synthesized 
bids, while limiting co-tenants who opted for a partition sale to 
their share of FMV. Additional design features might be added 
to control inflated partial-partition bids by FMV co-tenants.60 
As this brief survey has suggested, it does not seem possible 
to design a fully incentive-compatible mechanism given the con-
straints we have specified and the goals we are pursuing. Which 
of the options canvassed above will perform best is an empirical 
question and one that could benefit from formal modeling. We 
will close with a brief summary of how such a procedure might 
be operationalized under the last alternative discussed above, 
recognizing that a different set of rules for payments and pay-
outs might ultimately prove superior. 
B. A Possible Approach 
To fix ideas and to provide a springboard for further empiri-
cal and theoretical work, we offer the following three-step pro-
posal for a new judicial partition protocol.61 It will not produce 
 
[in a Clarke-Groves voting mechanism] would be for pairs of communities to agree to ex-
change their collections of these excess revenues.”); Abraham Bell and Gideon Par-
chomovsky, Governing Communities by Auction, 81 U Chi L Rev 1, 24–25 (2014) (dis-
cussing possible uses of excess funds generated by their auction mechanism, including 
sharing arrangements among communities). 
 60 See text accompanying notes 63–64.  
 61 Our proposal most resembles a first-price, sealed-bid auction. See Rotem and 
Dekel, 32 Rev Litig at 358–73 (cited in note 52). Note, however, that the co-tenant con-
text differs from that of ordinary auctions in one important respect: co-tenants who place 
bids may wind up as either buyers or sellers (that is, takers or takees), while in ordinary 
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first-best results, but we think it could represent an improve-
ment over the status quo. 
1. Step one: electing a partition method. 
A co-owner seeking judicial partition would first be required 
to state his or her preference for one of two alternatives: full 
partition of the property by sale, or partial partition in kind. A 
co-owner who seeks full partition of the property by sale would 
be requesting the liquidation of the property at FMV. A co-
owner who wished to remain on the land could petition for par-
tial partition in kind.62  To invoke this procedure, a co-owner 
might have to meet additional criteria, such as demonstrating a 
connection to the property, satisfying a holding period,63 or post-
ing a bond that will be forfeited if she wins the right to remain 
on the property but sells within a particular time frame.64 
2. Step two: valuation. 
The court would ask each party petitioning for partial parti-
tion in kind to submit the following: (1) a diagram of the proper-
ty with any area in which the individual holds subjective value 
clearly marked, (2) a statement of the total value that the indi-
vidual places on the marked area, and (3) an independent ap-
praisal of the balance of the property. Following the values given 
in Table 1 above, Ann would submit a diagram with the entire 
property marked and a value of $300K indicated. Casper would 
submit a diagram with the garage apartment area (area 3) 
 
auctions, bidders occupy only the role of potential buyers (absent collusion with sellers to 
submit fake bids). 
 62 Although partial-partition procedures fit most naturally with multiparty scenar-
ios like the one elaborated in the text, co-tenants in two-party scenarios would also get 
the same choices: partial partition in kind or full partition by sale. Even when only two 
parties are involved, one party’s share can still be liquidated through sale while the oth-
er is awarded in kind. Similarly, one co-tenant could request to retain in-kind possession 
of an unequal share of the property or even the entire property (as in the case of Ann, 
above, who had subjective value in the full tract). 
 63 For an example of a similar restriction employed in Arkansas, see Kuperman, 
Note, 77 Brooklyn L Rev at 288 (cited in note 43), citing Ark Code Ann § 18-60-404 (re-
quiring a three-year waiting period before a co-tenant who purchases a minority interest 
as “a stranger to the title”—defined as not being related to any of the others within four 
degrees of consanguinity—can petition for partition). 
 64 For a similar inalienability approach to preventing false self-assessments in the 
eminent domain context, see Bell and Parchomovksy, 59 Stan L Rev at 892–95 (cited in 
note 49). 
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marked and a value of $155K indicated, and would also submit 
an appraisal for the balance of the property (areas 1 and 2). 
When multiple HSV co-tenants have attachments to 
nonoverlapping pieces of the property, they may elect to file a 
combined submission with the court, or they may file separate 
submissions. Any party filing a separate submission should in-
dicate to the court whether she wishes to have her submission 
combined with those of the other co-tenants seeking partial par-
tition, where it is possible to do so.65 
If the submissions reflect conflicting plans for partitioning 
the property, the court will order an auction at which bids will 
be automatically placed on behalf of the co-tenants seeking par-
tial partition in kind. Each such bid would be constructed from 
the reservation price stated for the portion of the property that 
the co-tenant wishes to retain plus the fair market value of the 
balance of the property. To return to our earlier example, a bid 
of $305K would be submitted on behalf of Casper ($155K valua-
tion of area 3, plus $150K FMV of areas 1 and 2), and a bid of 
$300K would be submitted on behalf of Ann (reflecting her sub-
jective valuation of the whole property). 
3. Step three: deciding and settling up. 
In our example, Casper would win the bid. He would get to 
keep area 3, and areas 1 and 2 would be sold for their FMV 
($150K). Casper would be required to make a payment into a 
fund that would be sufficient to give his co-tenants their shares 
of the full economic value revealed by his bid. Casper would thus 
have to pay $53.33K, the difference between Ann and Burt’s col-
lective $203.33K share of $305K and the FMV sales price of 
$150K for areas 1 and 2. 
Ann and Burt do not actually receive this full amount, how-
ever. Instead, Ann (as a co-tenant who also elected partial parti-
tion in kind) would receive enough to make up one-third of her 
$300K bid (here, $25K)66 and Burt (who did not elect partial par-
tition in kind) would receive enough to make up his share of the 
 
 65 Space does not permit tracing all the wrinkles associated with these “bundling” 
alternatives. The basic intuition is that a group of HSV co-tenants might have a com-
bined valuation that exceeds the FMV of the entire parcel, even though no single HSV 
co-tenant would have a high enough valuation on her own. 
 66 This amount is calculated by subtracting her share from the sale of areas 1 and 2 
($75K) from her share of her own bid ($100K). 
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$250K in FMV (here, $8.33K).67 The balance of the funds paid by 
Casper (that is, the portion that was not disbursed to Ann and 
Burt; here, $20K)68 goes into a fund earmarked for co-tenant 
mediation efforts or for administering the system.69 
* * * 
This three-step approach does not address all difficulties. 
There is still room for parties to strategize, and concerns with 
understatements and overstatements will remain. Nonetheless, 
we think a procedure of this sort may offer a significant im-
provement over the binary choice between partition in kind and 
partition by sale. Whether or not our readers agree, we hope our 
proposal spurs further discussion about the best way to address 
partition problems. More broadly, we hope that our dissection of 
the co-tenancy problem offers insights for the use of self-
assessment techniques in other contexts. 
CONCLUSION 
Analysis of co-ownership partition needs to go beyond an ex 
post comparison of partition in kind and partition by sale. While 
we agree that scale economies and subjective value are the 
foremost concerns in determining the most efficient partition 
approach in a given dispute, this Article contributes to the liter-
ature by examining when and how we might employ revelation 
mechanisms that harness otherwise hard-to-verify subjective 
values. We show how such approaches might be integrated into 
 
 67 This amount is calculated by subtracting his share from the sale of areas 1 and 2 
($75K) from his share of the property’s FMV ($83.33K). 
 68 $20K = $53.33K − $25K − $8.33K. For co-tenants, the $20K that goes to the fund 
is money left on the table. If they have good information as to how much each other 
would bid, they may reach an agreement of voluntary partition. Facilitating ex ante bar-
gaining is an advantage of our proposal. Note that because voluntary partition has to be 
consensual, no co-tenant would agree to a deal that makes him worse off. That is, the 
$20K would only make all or some of the co-tenants better off in voluntary agreements, 
as compared to judicial partition. Court costs also represent savings that parties could 
realize through a voluntary arrangement. See Baucells and Lippman, 22 Cardozo L Rev 
at 1207–09 (cited in note 6) (modeling the effect of legal costs on bargaining dynamics). 
 69 Our analysis here assumes that the property, or relevant pieces of it, will actual-
ly sell at FMV. As we point out in Appendix B, the property is likely to be sold below 
FMV at court auctions. Addressing the risk of below-FMV bids requires additional de-
sign features that space does not permit us to fully elaborate here, but the general ap-
proach would entail providing opportunities for co-tenants to bid on the relevant portions 
of the property so that a negotiated sale can be conducted at a later date. The fund could 
also be used to fill in the gap if the sale price of the sold portion falls below the appraised 
value. 
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intermediate partition approaches, such as partial partition, 
which are prevalent in practice but currently undertheorized. 
Moreover, our analysis looks not only at the partition event in 
isolation, but also at the way in which partition rules influence 
earlier decisions. More empirical and theoretical work on the in-
stitution of co-ownership is needed to test the strategies that 
this Article has discussed or proposed, but we hope to have indi-
cated here some directions such work might take. 
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Appendices to Partition and Revelation 
Yun-chien Chang† & Lee Anne Fennell†† 
APPENDIX A.  A COMPARISON OF DEFAULT JUDICIAL  
PARTITION RULES 
In this Appendix we provide a short comparative survey of 
default judicial partition rules of real estate.1 The judicial parti-
tion regime is constructed of a presumption (or lack thereof) for 
partition in sale or in kind, a specification of the conditions that 
will override that presumption, and a variety of other special 
features. 
I. Presumptions and Overrides 
An initial question that each jurisdiction’s law must address 
is whether partition in kind or partition by sale will be the pre-
ferred approach, and how strong the presumption in favor of 
that approach will be. 
A number of modern jurisdictions take the position that 
courts should favor partition in kind. This is adopted in Germa-
ny,2 France,3 Japan,4 China,5 and Taiwan.6 Empirical studies in 
 
 † Associate Research Professor & Deputy Director of Center for Empirical Legal 
Studies, Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. JSD, New York Univer-
sity School of Law. Email: kleiber@sinica.edu.tw. 
 †† Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, 
University of Chicago Law School. 
 These appendices supplement Yun-chien Chang and Lee Anne Fennell, Partition and 
Revelation, 81 U Chi L Rev 27 (2014), online at https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page 
/chang-fennell. 
 1 Some jurisdictions have addressed partition of chattel property separately. In 
East Germany, for example, the rule was a mandate of partition by sale for real estate 
and a preference for partition in kind for movables. See Civil Code of the German Demo-
cratic Republic Art 41, as translated in 1–2 Law and Legislation in the German Demo-
cratic Republic 31 (Lawyers Association 1976). 
 2 Ger Civil Code § 753, as translated in Gesetze im Internet (Juris 2013) (Langen-
scheidt Translation Service, trans), online at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ 
bgb/englisch_bgb.html (visited Oct 30, 2013). 
 3 Fr Civil Code Art 815, 827, as translated in Legifrance (France 2006) (Georges 
Rouhette and Anne Rouhette-Berton, trans), online at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
Traductions/en-English/Legifrance-translations (visited Oct 30, 2013). 
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Taiwan show that the court orders partition in kind only about 
20 percent of the time.7 Most American jurisdictions, as introduced 
in the main text, have a common law rule that purports to favor 
partition in kind, but scholars suggest that courts in the United 
States usually order partition by sale.8 Thus, partition law in ac-
tion might deviate significantly from the partition law on the 
books. 
The opposite presumption, that courts should favor partition 
by sale, has been adopted in Denmark.9 A third rule that es-
chews any presumption in favor of either partition approach has 
been adopted in the Netherlands.10 There, courts are required to 
select a partition approach according to public interests and pri-
vate interests.11 
A more extreme possibility would disallow or disable courts 
from pursuing a particular partition approach. We are aware of 
one jurisdiction, Russia, in which the court has no power to or-
der partition by sale.12 When partition in kind is “not permitted 
by a law or is impossible without incommensurate damage to 
property in common ownership, the partitioning owner shall have 
 
 4 Civil Code of Japan Art 258, as translated in Japanese Law Translation (Minis-
try of Justice 2013), online at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/ 
?id=2057&vm=02&re=02&new=1 (visited Feb 2, 2014). 
 5 Property Law of the People’s Republic of China Art 100, as translated in Property 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, online at http://www.china.org.cn/china/ 
LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21897791.htm (visited Feb 5, 2014). 
Value reduction is one justification for using partition by sale. Note that in China, only 
buildings and other improvements are subject to private co-ownership and hence to par-
tition, as all of the underlying land is owned either by the state or by a collective. See 
Yun-chien Chang, Property Law with Chinese Characteristics: An Economic and Com-
parative Analysis, 1 Brigham-Kanner Prop Rts Conference J 345, 347 (2012); Property 
Law of the People’s Republic of China Art 47, 58 (cited in note 5); China Const Art 10, 
online at http://english.gov.cn/2005-08/05/content_20813.htm (visited Feb 10, 2014). 
 6 Taiwan Civil Code Art 824, as translated in Laws & Regulations Database of the 
Republic of China (Ministry of Justice 2012), online at http://law.moj.gov.tw/eng/ 
LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=B0000001 (visited Oct 31, 2013). 
 7 Yun-chien Chang, Tenancy in “Anticommons”? A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis of Co-ownership, 4 J Legal Analysis 515, 535 (2012). 
 8 See Yun-chien Chang and Lee Anne Fennell, Partition and Revelation, 81 U Chi 
L Rev 27, 30 n 12 (2014). 
 9 See Tanya-Caroline Hitchcock and Malene Stein Poulson, Dänemark, in Chris-
tian von Bar, ed, 1 Sachenrecht in Europa: Systematische Einführungen und Gesetzestex-
te 7, 62 (Rasch 2000). 
 10 Civil Code of the Neth § 3:185, as translated in The Civil Code of the Netherlands 
475–76 (Wolters Kluwer 2009) (Hans Warendorf, Richard Thomas, and Ian Curry-
Sumner, trans). 
 11 Civil Code of the Neth § 3:185(1), as translated in The Civil Code of the Nether-
lands at 475–76 (cited in note 10). 
 12 See Chang and Fennell, 81 U Chi L Rev at 37 n 42 (2014) (cited in note 8). 
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the right to payment to him of the value of his participatory share 
by the other participants of participatory share ownership.”13 The 
latter procedure effectively extends a put option to the owner 
who desires partition, forcing a sale of that party’s share to the 
others. 
II. Additional Features 
The basic choice of approach—partition in kind or partition 
by sale—is only part of the story. A number of other features 
determine how partition operates on the ground. First, there can 
be procedural preconditions to seeking judicial partition (of any 
sort). Some countries, for example, require that parties attempt 
voluntary partition before seeking judicial partition. The decision 
to partition in kind implicates additional choices, sometimes 
economically significant, about exactly how to physically split 
the land. When property is not amenable to division into equally 
valuable segments, perhaps due to improvements, partition in 
kind may require compensatory transfer payments among the 
parties, known as owelty.14 
Partition by sale requires additional choices about the way 
in which the sale will be structured. A basic distinction can be 
drawn between negotiated sales procedures and auction proce-
dures, and the two may produce different outcomes and have dif-
ferent efficiency implications. Other details, such as opportuni-
ties for inspection and the types of payments that are allowed, 
can influence who is likely to bid. For example, Professor Phyliss 
Craig-Taylor argues that a supermajority vote should be required 
for the court to order partition by sale; she recommends that the 
court allow for time for winning bidders to pay, so that co-
owners would be able to make a bid.15 Sometimes courts place 
rather extreme constraints on the sales procedure to constrict 
participation. In one South African case, Kruger v Terblanche,16 
the court ordered a partition by sale but stipulated that only the 
 
 13 Civil Code of the Rus Federation Art 252(3), as translated in 2 Russia & the 
Republics Legal Materials Part One at 123 (Juris 2013) (William E. Butler, ed and 
trans). 
 14 See John G. Casagrande Jr, Note, Acquiring Property through Forced Partition-
ing Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 BC L Rev 755, 764 (1986). 
 15 See Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored Looking Glass: A View of Judicial 
Partition, Family Land Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 Wash U L Q 737, 780–81 (2000). 
 16 1979 (4) SA 38 (D), as translated in The South African Law Reports 1281 (Juta 
1979) (J.C. Ferreira, J.H. Kok, and B.G. Morrison, eds). 
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two brothers who were the co-owners of the farm in question 
could participate in the bidding.17 
APPENDIX B.  AUCTIONS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
In this Appendix, we provide an overview of empirical and 
theoretical work on property auctions to supplement our discus-
sion in the main text. 
Professor Christopher Mayer has argued that in English 
(ascending bid) auctions, “[a]uction prices should be lower than 
prices for houses sold at negotiated sales, with the possible ex-
ception of auctions held in very ‘hot’ markets.”18 The auction dis-
count results from the fact that auction sales are limited to buy-
ers who are in the market in a given period, while sales taking 
place in the listing market allow the seller to search for a high-
er-valuing buyer over multiple periods.19 Mayer’s empirical work 
finds that auctioned property never sells at a premium.20 Other 
scholars who have studied English auction versus negotiated 
sales in the real estate market, however, disagree with Mayer. 
Professors Daniel Quan,21 Kenneth Lusht,22 and Mark Dotzour 
 
 17 For a discussion of co-ownership and Kruger, see C.G. van der Merwe, Law of 
Property, in C.G. van der Merwe and Jacques E. du Plessis, eds, Introduction to the Law 
of South Africa 201, 221 (Kluwer 2004). 
 18 See Christopher J. Mayer, A Model of Negotiated Sales Applied to Real Estate 
Auctions, 38 J Urban Econ 1, 20 (1995). But see Daniel C. Quan, Real Estate Auctions: A 
Survey of Theory and Practice, 9 J Real Est Fin & Econ 23, 38–39 (1994) (criticizing 
Mayer’s approach, because it assumes that “auction sales [do] not influence the equilib-
rium price of houses sold in the negotiated market”). 
 19 See Christopher J. Mayer, Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions, 26 
Real Est Econ 41, 44 (1998). See also Hanoch Dagan and Michael A. Heller, The Liberal 
Commons, 110 Yale L J 549, 607 (2001) (arguing that auctioned properties are sold at 
below fair market value because there are fewer bidders for auctioned properties than 
potential buyers for properties on the open market). 
 20 Mayer, 26 Real Est Econ at 53–61 (cited in note 19). Professors George Gau and 
Daniel Quan’s hedonic model in their unpublished work also shows that auction prices 
are significantly lower than negotiated sales. See George W. Gau and Daniel C. Quan, 
Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Disposition: Negotiated Sale versus Auction 
*13 (UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Management Recent Work, June 1992), online 
at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/77f5k3x9 (visited Oct 31, 2013). Interestingly, this em-
pirical result is contrary to the prediction of Quan’s mathematical model. See Quan, 9 J 
Real Est Fin & Econ at 44 (cited in note 18), for an explanation of the contradictory result. 
 21 See Daniel C. Quan, Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Disposition: 
Search versus Auction, 30 Real Est Econ 365, 368 (2002) (using 202 auctions and negoti-
ated sales from Austin, Texas, in hedonic regression models and finding that on average, 
the auction prices for vacant land are approximately 30 percent higher than the negoti-
ated sale prices). 
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et al,23 using a similar quantitative strategy (that is different 
from Mayer’s),24 find that on average auctions sell at a premium. 
Nevertheless, as Mayer points out, these empirical works may 
suffer from omitted variable bias, because sellers’ decisions to 
put their properties on the list market or the auction market is 
probably endogenous.25 
English auctions are not the only type of auction that sells 
real estate at a discount. In Taiwan,26 where courts sell off prop-
erties through first-price, sealed-bid auctions, auctioned proper-
ties, as compared to comparable properties sold in the search 
market, are empirically found to be sold at an average discount 
of about 17 percent.27 Generally very few bidders participate in 
any given court auction.28 Courts in Taiwan provide little infor-
mation on the auctioned properties and are not always committed 
to handing over unpossessed properties to the winning bidders.29 
Because only distressed properties (such as real estate under 
foreclosure) are auctioned by courts in Taiwan, the auction 
discount may reflect the uncertainty of property conditions, ra-
ther than indicating the different effects on prices of sale mech-
anisms. Nonetheless, the fact remains that partition by sale does 
not always liquidate properties at or above fair market value. 
 
 22 See Kenneth M. Lusht, A Comparison of Prices Brought by English Auctions and 
Private Negotiations, 24 Real Est Econ 517, 528 (1996) (finding that English auctions of 
nondistressed properties yield an average premium of 8 percent in Australia). 
 23 See Mark G. Dotzour, Everard Moorhead, and Daniel T. Winkler, The Impact of 
Auctions on Residential Sales Prices in New Zealand, 16 J Real Est Rsrch 57, 67 (1998) 
(finding that auctions of nondistressed properties in Christchurch, New Zealand, produce 
either no premium or a positive premium). 
 24 These studies all use an auction dummy variable to identify whether auctioned 
properties on average sell at a premium as compared to properties sold in the listing 
market. By contrast, Mayer uses weighted repeat-sale regression models. His use of 
repeated sales that have been sold in both auctions and search markets controls for the 
omitted variable bias. See Mayer, 26 Real Est Econ at 46–49 (cited in note 19). 
 25 See Mayer, 26 Real Est Econ at 45–46 (cited in note 19); Quan, 9 J Real Est Fin 
& Econ at 43–44 (cited in note 18) (recognizing this point). 
 26 For a brief overview of how the auction market in Taiwan works, see Vickey, 
Chiu-Chin Lin and Chiung-Ying Huang, A Comparison between the Semi-parametric and 
Parametric CAMA Modeling of Court Auction Residential Housing Market in the Taipei 
Metropolitan Area, 16 J Housing Stud 85, 87 (2007). 
 27 See Chin-Oh Chang, Chien-An Wang, and Yi-Ju Chen, The Puzzle of the Discount 
Price for the Foreclosed House: Does the Factor of Competition Explain More Discounts?, 
28 Chiao Da Mgmt Rev 1, 27 (Vol 2, 2008), online at http://www.airitilibrary.com/ 
Publication/alDetailedMesh?docid=10287310-200812-28-2-1-39-a (visited Feb 17, 2014). 
 28 See id at 14 (finding that in 2001–2002, in 46.6 percent of the court auctions in 
Taiwan, there was only one bidder). 
 29 See id at 5. 
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APPENDIX C.  BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF  
JUDICIAL PARTITION 
 In this Appendix, we supplement the main text’s analysis of 
the impact of judicial partition rules on pre-partition bargaining 
dynamics by working through an extended example.  
I. Bargaining with No Economy of Scale 
We start with the simplest scenario, in which there is no 
economy of scale; that is, the sale price through partition by sale is 
the aggregation of the market values of the post-physical-division 
plots held by the former co-tenants. The analytical framework 
laid out in the text suggests that without an assembly premium, 
partition in kind is more efficient. Nonetheless, because subjec-
tive increments among co-tenants vary, it is not always in all 
co-owners’ interest to support the plan of physical division. Since 
unanimity is the universal rule for voluntary partition, it leaves 
room for strategic bargaining. 
Consider the following example: Dan, Eileen, and Frank co-own 
Blackacre in equal shares. The co-owners have agreed that each 
co-tenant will manage a one-third section of the plot,30 each of 
which has a fair market value (FMV) of w. Dan and Eileen at-
tach an additional subjective increment to the part they have 
managed for some time, while Frank does not. Assume that s 
and 2s are the added subjective increments for Dan and Eileen, 
respectively. The total economic value or reservation prices of 
Dan, Eileen, and Frank on their separately managed parts are 
w + s, w + 2s, and w, respectively. If the total market value of 
Blackacre, sold intact, is w + w + w = 3w, physical division does 
not decrease economy of scale. Following Professors Thomas 
Miceli and C.F. Sirmans, partition in kind (following the exist-
ing management plan) should be adopted because it preserves 
subjective value and produces total economic value of 
w + (w + s) + (w + 2s) = 3w + 3s, which is higher than 3w (the 
likely value of the property to a third party) or 3w + 2s (the 
 
 30 For discussion of this type of covenant, see Yun-chien Chang and Henry E. 
Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil versus Common Law Property, 88 Notre Dame L 
Rev 1, 45–46 (2012); Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi, and Richard K. Green, 
Forced Sale Risk: Class, Race, and the “Double Discount”, 37 Fla St U L Rev 589, 616 
(2010); Dagan and Heller, 110 Yale L J at 619 (cited in note 19).  
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value of the property in Eileen’s hands, assuming she wins the 
bid).31 
Next, consider the bargaining situation that the parties will 
find themselves in before seeking judicial partition. If Blackacre 
is physically partitioned (according to the co-tenants’ predefined 
territories), they each receive their economic value specified 
above. Dan and Eileen will prefer this approach. Frank, howev-
er, might prefer partition by sale. Dan and Eileen have positive 
subjective values, and if either or both of them have the finan-
cial flexibility and willingness to bid in the court auction, the 
auction price could be higher than 3w, the fair market value of 
Blackacre. Frank would then receive a share of the subjective 
increment that one or both of them have in the property. 
Table C1 shows the parties’ payouts for different sorts of 
partition procedures. In each case, the parties lose their frac-
tional undivided claims on the property and get, in exchange, ei-
ther land (designated by the shaded cells) or money. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 See Thomas J. Miceli and C.F. Sirmans, Partition of Real Estate; or, Breaking Up 
Is (Not) Hard to Do, 29 J Legal Stud 783, 793 (2000). We assume for the moment that 
Dan and Eileen are unable to combine forces to put in the high bid and that Eileen will 
not otherwise ultimately transfer the portion Dan values to Dan. That assumption will 
be relaxed below. See Appendix C.II. 
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TABLE C1.  PAYOFFS UNDER FOUR PARTITION PLANS 
 Dan’s 
payoff 
Eileen’s 
payoff 
Frank’s 
payoff 
Total  
(1) Partition in 
kind 
w + s† 
(tie) 
w + 2s† w 3w + 3s† 
(tie) 
(2) Partition by 
sale, and no co-
owner 
participates in 
the auction 
≦	w ≦ w ≦ w ≦	3w 
(3) Partition by 
sale, and 
Eileen is the 
highest bidder 
(at her 
reservation 
price) 
w + 2/3s w + 2/3s w + 2/3s 3w + 2s 
(4) Partition by 
sale, and 
Eileen and Dan 
coordinate to 
bid at their 
combined 
reservation 
price 
w + s† 
(tie) 
w + s w + s† 3w + 3s† 
(tie)  
† marks the best partition approach for each co-tenant and in total. 
Note: The shaded cells are outcomes in which the party holds onto all or part of 
the land. 
 
The parties’ negotiations take place in the shadow of these 
payouts. Because Frank stands to gain from a sale in which 
Dan, Eileen, or both bid their reservation prices, Frank might 
use the threat of a partition action to extract concessions from 
Dan and Eileen. To induce Frank to agree to in-kind partition, 
Dan and Eileen might offer Frank side payments—perhaps each 
chips in 1/3s. The bargaining may fail, however. First, if Dan and 
Eileen are confident that they can persuade a court to order parti-
tion in kind, they give up nothing (other than litigation expenses) 
and still get their preferred partition method. Second, the subjec-
tive values of Dan and Eileen are not verifiable by Frank. This 
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may hinder a deal if Frank thinks Dan and Eileen will understate 
their subjective values and lowball their offers. 
It is also worth emphasizing that, in this example, there 
may be no surplus to be gained from completing the partition. 
By hypothesis, there are no economies of scale, and the parties 
already have in place an agreement that lets them manage sep-
arate areas separately. Although economic analysis has general-
ly assumed that partition is the efficient result when a co-tenant 
seeks it (and has sought to determine only how to achieve it at 
lowest cost), the threat of a partition action might be wielded 
within an otherwise functional co-tenancy simply to extract sur-
plus from other parties. Such a threat becomes more potent the 
more likely the court is to order partition by sale under a mech-
anism that does a good job of inducing co-tenants with high 
subjective values to reveal—and disgorge a share of—their res-
ervation prices. A blunter auction procedure (or a judicial prefer-
ence for partition in kind) would remove Frank’s source of gain 
from partition, and with it, his ability to threaten Dan and Eileen. 
II. Adding Economy of Scale 
How does the scenario above change if there is economy of 
scale in maintaining Blackacre intact? This requires us to exam-
ine the relationship between subjective value and market value. 
Recall that the s term above represented a subjective increment, 
a premium over and above the market value of the property. 
This was straightforward in a static analysis in which market 
value did not change, but we must now contend with situations 
in which the market value changes depending on the property’s 
configuration. 
Consider first a scenario like the one given above, in which 
Dan, Eileen, and Frank are each currently managing separate 
areas of Blackacre. Suppose Dan and Eileen are running small 
family farms for their households on their respective areas, and 
Frank is renting out “his” portion as a sheep grazing area. The 
entire Blackacre property could be converted to a commercial 
farming operation that would increase the market value of the 
whole parcel by 2w, to a total of 5w. In the example above, Dan 
had a subjective increment of s, and Eileen had a subjective incre-
ment of 2s. This increment attaches to their current use of the 
property in family farming, which does not exploit the economies 
of scale associated with using the parcel as a whole. 
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What happens now if Frank pushes for partition by sale? 
The market price for the parcel as a whole is now 5w. But Dan 
can be expected only to bid up to 3w + s, as before, and Eileen 
likewise can only be expected to bid up to 3w + 2s. This is because 
if Eileen, for example, wins the bid, she will only be able to sell 
the balance of the land (the portions she has not been managing) 
for 2w, having destroyed economies of scale by retaining the 
originally managed portion. If Dan and Eileen can work together 
to bid, they would bid a maximum of 3w + 3s; Dan would retain 
his area and enjoy w + s, Eileen would retain her area and get 
w + 2s, and the balance would be sold at fair market value, w. 
Whether Dan, Eileen, or Dan and Eileen together will be the 
high bidder in a partition sale depends, then, on how s compares 
with w, as well as on the liquidity and auction design factors 
mentioned in Appendices A and B, above. 
Regardless of who is the high bidder, partition by sale will 
likely bring Frank something more valuable than his current 
parcel, which is valued at w.32 He will get one of the following: 
12/3w (if the whole parcel is sold at fair market value); w + 2/3s (if 
Eileen is the high bidder at her reservation price); or w + s (if 
Dan and Eileen together have the high bid at their joint reserva-
tion price). Here the partition sale could serve the valuable func-
tion of testing whether 3w + 3s (the highest use of the land in 
pieces) is greater than 5w (the highest use of the land as a con-
solidated unit). But it will only do so if Dan and Eileen are able 
to bid. 
If Frank knows that 3w + 3s is greater than 5w, but also 
knows that Dan and Eileen lack the liquidity to put in the 
3w + 3s bid, he could try to demand side payments in order to go 
along with a voluntary partition in kind. Alternatively, if Frank 
knows that Dan and Eileen could be forced (perhaps by his own 
competing bid) to bid their full joint reservation price, he could at-
tempt to extract much of this value through side payments instead. 
Frank will be more successful in his demands the greater is the 
perceived risk that a judicial partition would be by sale rather 
than in kind, and the greater is the chance that Dan and Eileen 
will either be unable to bid, or forced to bid their full value. 
What if, instead, 5w exceeds 3w + 3s? Where economies 
of scale are large relative to subjective premia, the latter can 
 
 32 It is possible Frank would not get a larger share if the auction procedure leads to 
a sale at a deep discount below FMV. But in such a case, Frank himself could be the high 
bidder and resell in a negotiated sale setting where he would be likely to obtain FMV. 
02 CHANG&FENNELL_SYMP_APPX_FLIP (JVB) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2014 9:09 AM 
2014] Appendices to Partition and Revelation 11 
 
become irrelevant. In other words, the fact that a partition pro-
cedure neglects the subjective valuations of the co-owners may 
have no impact on the final allocation of land. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that w is $100K and s is $50K. 3w + 3s is $450K, which is 
less than 5w ($500K). Whether the co-owners’ subjective valua-
tions are ignored altogether or fully known and accounted for, 
the result would remain unchanged; the assembly premium as-
sociated with keeping the property intact is so great as to over-
whelm the subjective increments associated with keeping it in 
pieces. 
In the scenarios above, the ability for Dan and Eileen to en-
joy subjective increments depended on them retaining separate 
control of subsets of the land; their subjective valuations did not 
attach to the consolidated configuration that maximized market 
value. But we could also imagine instances in which a co-owner’s 
subjective valuation would attach to the entire consolidated 
unit, as where one tenant has been in sole possession and has 
become attached to the entire tract. Similarly, things that make 
a parcel generally more valuable to the market (such as nearby 
urban development) could either increase or decrease the subjec-
tive enjoyment that one or more co-owners get from the proper-
ty.33 Thus, large changes in market value, whether associated with 
scale economies or not, can render moot uncorrelated subjective 
values held by the co-owners. 
This analysis aligns with that of Miceli and Sirmans if the 
question is limited to whether judicial partition in kind or by 
sale is more efficient ex post.34 But the distributive impacts of 
the two alternatives may lead to different ex ante bargaining 
dynamics among the co-tenants. In the numeric example above, 
Eileen would receive a value of $200K (that is, w + 2s) under 
partition in kind, whereas she would receive one-third of $500K 
under partition by sale, or $166.66K. She is therefore made 
worse off by the shift from partition in kind to partition by sale, 
despite the allocative efficiency of selling the property as a unit. 
If partition in kind is the rule, Dan or Frank might be able to 
make a side payment to Eileen sufficient to convince her to 
 
 33 It is therefore useful to think of the subjective increment as being reverse engi-
neered for any given co-owner; it can be obtained by subtracting the market value from 
the co-owner’s total reservation price (economic value) for the property. Thus the s term 
is not fixed for a given co-owner, but can only be determined once we know how her res-
ervation price compares to the (current) market value. 
 34 See text accompanying note 31. 
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support a voluntary sale instead. If partition by sale is the rule, 
Eileen might attempt to pay Dan and Frank not to petition for 
the sale, but she would fail (she could not pay them enough to 
stop the sale). 
APPENDIX D.  DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 
This Appendix explores the possibility that diseconomies of 
scale, as well as the economies of scale discussed in the main 
text, can weigh in favor of partition by sale on efficiency 
grounds. Consider a large tract of land, represented by the large 
square in Figure D1, that will serve its highest and best use if it 
is divided up into nine small tracts containing single-family, 
owner-occupied dwellings.35 Suppose there are four co-tenants. 
The small number of co-tenants and the large size of the tract 
relative to the highest and best use of the land might seem to 
argue for partition in kind,36 but dividing the tract among the 
co-tenants could easily impede getting the land into its most 
useful configuration. 
FIGURE D1.  PARTITION IN KIND WITH DISECONOMIES OF SCALE 
 
 
As Figure D1 demonstrates, producing four of these nine 
lots would require the cooperation of two former co-owners, and 
 
 35 Agency problems with the rental form might explain the preference for dividing 
the tract into separately owned parcels. See Edward L. Glaeser, Rethinking the Federal 
Bias toward Homeownership, 13 Cityscape: J Pol Dev & Rsrch 5, 6 (Number 2 2011) (“In 
general, ownership should be lodged with the agent who is in the best position to 
make investments and, in the case of a single-family detached house, that agent is 
the resident.”). 
 36 See Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Legal Stud at 792–93 (cited in note 31) (explaining 
that scale effects that would argue for a forced sale over partition in kind are less likely 
to be present where the number of co-tenants is few and the parcel is large). 
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producing one of them would require the cooperation of all four. 
Partition by sale thus may provide the smoothest path to opti-
mal scale, even where diseconomies of scale are involved.37 
 
 37 One might instead characterize the situation in Figure D1 as a special case of 
positive economies of scale, if the land use in question is defined as follows: serving as a 
canvas for the optimal subdivision of land where returns to scale are not constant. A 
larger tract offers more alternatives for efficient subdivision than does a group of smaller 
tracts. Regardless, the situation is one that would not get picked out as a candidate for 
partition by sale by the Miceli and Sirmans approach. See Miceli and Sirmans, 29 J Le-
gal Stud at 793 (cited in note 36). Their analysis does, however, recognize a conceptually 
related case of scale effects. See id at 789 n 17 (describing a situation in which the full 
parcel is no more valuable than the sum of the pieces held by the n individual co-tenants, 
but the land might be more profitably divided into fewer than n pieces). 
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